Andrew Krepinevich’s latest opinion page in the Wall Street Journal misses the mark, and falls short to splash into the veritable sea of
similar pieces regarding China’s designs in the Western Pacific.
He begins the article by invoking the spectre of the Cold
War, but the “Finlandization” he describes is simply what all regional hegemons
attempt to do with smaller neighbors – persuade them to support the hegemon’s
foreign policy objectives.
If Krepinevich is to be believed, only the dubious advantage
of the American military presence in Western Europe prevented this from
becoming the lot of all European states. Ipso facto, a strong US military
presence in Asia is the only way for America to prevent China from shaping the
region’s foreign policy.
Unfortunately, the Western Pacific in 2010 is nothing like
Western Europe in 1980. The US cannot provide a credible military advantage in
this theater – even if it wasn’t bogged down in land wars elsewhere. The
long-standing “cult of the carrier” has seen the American hare caught napping
by the side of the road, long since passed by a slow and steady Chinese tortoise
that has been willing to re-imagine naval warfare in the Western Pacific. While
American Naval power was viewed in an expeditionary nature in the 1994 doctrine
of “Forward… From the Sea”, China’s can very easily be condensed to “Fire… From
the Shore.”
Lord Nelson opined in the Age of Sail that “a ship’s a fool
to fight a fort” – acknowledging the superior firepower that shore-based
weaponry could bring to bear on ships of the line. There’s nothing new under
the sun, and technology has once again put the advantage firmly on shoreline –
and this has implications that go far beyond China. Any country (or non-state
actor) with a few million dollars in hand can purchase
“missiles in a box” that will seriously challenge current expeditionary military capabilities – even
those of regional hegemons such as the US, China, and Russia.
Krepinevich appears to acknowledge this fact in the middle
of his article, yet makes no solid recommendations for changing the seemingly
inevitable shift in military power. The remainder of the article has the
obligatory China-bashing – they didn’t acknowledge North Korea’s role in
sinking the Cheonan (we did, but took no real action to punish the alleged
perpetrators) and characterizes the country as Voldemort – the root of the
Navy’s concerns about “assured access”, but one that is not officially named in
reports such as the current Quadrennial Defense Review. He closes by stating that:
Washington's longstanding allies
and friends in the Western Pacific want a stable military balance in the region
that will encourage Beijing to pursue its goals according to accepted
international norms of behavior.
But there hasn’t been a balance of power in the Western
Pacific since 1945 – the US has always been militarily predominant in this
theater. The rise of Chinese military power is only now beginning to create a
balance – and it is a balance that will inevitably shift to favor China – no
surprise, as any test of military might in the waters immediately adjacent to
the North American land mass would tend to favor the US.
It’s long past time to stop kvetching about the military
aspect of China’s “peaceful rise” and acknowledge that rather than taking on
the improbable challenge of matching their military, we should start laying the
groundwork for bilateral cooperation in the defense sector – open ourselves to
China as a true ally and partner, rather than continuing to regard them as
Voldemort – the enemy least mentioned, but most feared.